The Gulf states have spent years attempting to dealer peace between Iran and the West: Qatar brokered nuclear talks, Oman supplied back-channel diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran by way of 2024 and into 2025. Iran attacked them anyway. The concept the Gulf states have a accountability, an ethical one, to guard Iran from the results of its actions due to good neighbourliness is now grotesque in context. Iran didn’t return good neighbourliness. Iran returned ballistic missiles.
Iran’s place relies on three propositions. First, that Iran acted in lawful self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Constitution; that host international locations relinquished territorial sovereignty by permitting US army bases on their territory; and that the definition of aggression in Decision 3314 justifies the assault on these bases as lawful army targets. Every of those propositions is legally flawed, factually skewed, and tactically incorrect. Collectively, they add as much as a authorized argument that, if accepted, would make sure that the Gulf is completely destabilised, the essential ideas of worldwide legislation are destroyed, and, in a curious twist, the very safety threats that Iran is reacting to are bolstered.
The self-defence declare doesn’t meet the required authorized threshold
The UN Constitution, in Article 51, permits the usage of pressure solely in self-defence in opposition to an “armed assault”, and this time period isn’t outlined by reference to the state invoking it. The Worldwide Court docket of Justice, in instances comparable to Army and Paramilitary Actions in and in opposition to Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003), has interpreted the requirement of an “armed assault” underneath Article 51 of the UN Constitution restrictively. The Court docket distinguished between probably the most grave types of the usage of pressure, which qualify as armed assaults triggering the best of self-defence, and fewer grave makes use of of pressure that don’t. Accordingly, not each use of pressure, comparable to minor incidents or restricted army actions, quantities to an armed assault. On this gentle, the mere presence of international army bases in Gulf states, maintained for many years underneath defence agreements with host governments, wouldn’t in itself represent an armed assault in opposition to Iran.
Necessity and proportionality are additionally a part of customary worldwide legislation, requiring that self-defence be mandatory and proportional. Iran has not demonstrated both. Focusing on the territory of different sovereign Arab states in response to the coverage choices of america is neither mandatory, since diplomatic and United Nations avenues are nonetheless accessible, nor proportional, because it imposes army penalties on states that aren’t a celebration to any battle with Iran.
Critically, Article 51 additionally has a compulsory procedural component, in that any state using self-defence is instantly required to inform the Safety Council. Iran has persistently evaded this requirement in every of its escalatory actions. Whereas this may occasionally appear to be a minor component, it’s actually the means by which the worldwide neighborhood is ready to confirm and verify self-defence claims. A state that evades this requirement isn’t using Article 51. It’s exploiting the language of Article 51.
Iran’s studying of Decision 3314 is a elementary distortion
The availability of Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations Common Meeting Decision 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that an act of aggression contains the “motion of a State in permitting its territory, which it has positioned on the disposal of one other State, for use by that different State for perpetrating an act of aggression in opposition to a 3rd State”. Iran might depend on this provision to carry the Gulf states that host United States army bases accountable for any act of aggression dedicated from their territories in opposition to Iran. However, the mere presence of army bases isn’t adequate to carry them to be lawful army targets; this can rely on their precise contribution to army actions in opposition to Iran based mostly on the principles of worldwide humanitarian legislation.
Thus, such an Iranian studying can be incorrect on three distinct authorized grounds.
First, Decision 3314 is definitional in nature. The decision was adopted to help the Safety Council in figuring out when aggression has taken place, to not confer upon states the unilateral energy to punish states deemed to have dedicated aggression by way of the usage of pressure. The decision itself, in Article 2, asserts the ability of the Safety Council to make the dedication of what constitutes aggression. The self-application of Article 3(f) of the decision is due to this fact bypassed altogether.
Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the energetic launching of an assault, not the passive internet hosting of a army base. The authorized distinction is key. A state, in signing a defence treaty with one other and internet hosting the latter’s troops on its soil, is participating in a measure of sovereignty. A state, actively launching, coordinating, or enabling army strikes in opposition to a 3rd occasion, is engaged in a special matter altogether. Iran has not credibly proven this latter case. The presence of US troops or bases within the Gulf has been a reality for many years, and this has not constituted armed aggression in opposition to Iran underneath any authorized commonplace.
Third, even when Article 3(f) had been relevant, the suitable course can be to carry the matter to the Safety Council, to not launch unilateral army strikes. Common Meeting resolutions don’t override the Constitution. Iran can’t depend on a non-binding decision defining phrases to override the Chapter VII necessities for the usage of pressure or the clear standards of Article 51.
Sovereignty can’t be dictated by a neighbour’s strategic preferences
Iran, in invoking the precept of excellent neighbourliness, asks the Arab Gulf states to disclaim america basing rights. Good neighbourliness is a two-way precept, and it doesn’t enable for interference within the inner affairs of different states, actually not interference within the choices of different states just because they’re deemed inconvenient to the interfering state. All UN states possess the inherent proper to conclude defence treaties with whomever they select, and that is so whatever the opinion of their neighbours.
The asymmetry of Iran’s place is putting and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has energetic army relationships with Russia and China. Iran arms, funds, trains, and helps the actions of non-state army actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Power operates brazenly in numerous states, and this has been extensively documented in United Nations Panels of Consultants studies, in addition to different worldwide monitoring studies. In keeping with the requirements that Iran applies to the Gulf states, any state that hosts the actions of the IRGC, the switch of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies on its soil can be participating in aggression in opposition to third events. Iran is not going to settle for this precept when it’s utilized to itself. A authorized precept that’s unacceptable to the occasion to whom it could be utilized isn’t a authorized precept in any respect; it’s a political device.
A doctrine that defeats Iran’s personal strategic pursuits
From the angle of worldwide relations principle, Iran’s place follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to take away the exterior balancing structure of regional neighbours by claiming it to be hostile in nature. Nonetheless, this strategy is empirically self-defeating.
Underneath steadiness of risk principle, states react to offensive functionality, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s doctrine, in asserting the best to strike any state that hosts forces it perceives as a risk, drives each risk variable to most ranges for each state within the area. The plain consequence, evident within the knowledge, is that the states within the area and exterior powers have gotten extra, fairly than much less, securely built-in. The Fifth Fleet’s everlasting base in Bahrain, the UAE’s negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s deployments of THAADs, and Qatar’s enlargement of the Al Udeid base are reactions to Iran’s escalation, not causes of it.
From the angle of constructivism, the legitimacy of a authorized argument can be partly based mostly on the normative credibility of the state that presents the argument. The file of Iran’s compliance with IAEA laws, together with the enrichment of uranium to a purity stage of 60 p.c or extra in 2023–2024, interference with inspections, the removing of monitoring cameras, and the general violation of the non-proliferation regime, has undermined the credibility of the state considerably. A state that’s itself a violator of the authorized regime can’t declare the function of a law-abiding state looking for safety underneath the norms of the authorized regime.
Iran’s authorized rationale was all the time theoretically incorrect. What has occurred since February 28, 2026, has made Iran’s actions morally and politically incorrect. Iran didn’t merely goal US army property. The fact of the scenario is now documented and simple. Ballistic missiles and drones had been launched in opposition to Gulf states within the opening days of the battle. This marked the primary time one actor had concurrently attacked all six GCC states. Iran escalated its assaults in deliberate phases. Day 1: Iranian missiles had been fired in opposition to army bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles had been fired in opposition to civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles had been fired in opposition to the vitality sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh was attacked by Iran. Worldwide airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait had been attacked by Iranian missiles, ensuing within the suspension of flights all through the area. Movies from Bahrain documented an Iranian Shahed drone attacking an condominium constructing. This isn’t self-defence. That is the collective punishment of sovereign nations that went to extraordinary lengths to keep away from the battle.
The rationale supplied by Iran falls flat when one considers the actions Iran itself took. Its doctrine held that solely targets concerned within the preparation or launch of an assault in opposition to Iran had been official targets. Civilian airports are usually not army bases. Accommodations in Palm Jumeirah are usually not army command centres. An condominium advanced in Manama isn’t a weapons storage facility. By Iran’s personal said authorized rationale, none of those targets was official, but they had been attacked. This was not a authorized doctrine in any respect; it was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of struggle revealed this to be the case.
The views expressed on this article are the creator’s personal and don’t essentially replicate Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
