This story was originally published by Tech Policy Press.
The European Union’s push for technological sovereignty faces an uncomfortable contradiction.
Because the EU rolls out AI factories, gigafactories, and new information facilities, it’s making a surge in demand for the superior semiconductors that underpin synthetic intelligence. But Europe produces fewer than 10 p.c of the world’s chips and stays closely depending on U.S. designers and Asian producers for essentially the most superior processors.
That stress sits on the coronary heart of Chips Act 2.0, the European Fee’s deliberate overhaul of its flagship semiconductor technique.
The unique Chips Act, adopted in 2023, sought to boost Europe’s share of worldwide semiconductor manufacturing to twenty p.c by 2030. However the European Court docket of Auditors has warned that focus on is unlikely to be met, whereas the Fee’s personal projections put Europe’s market share at about 11.7 p.c.
The Fee now desires to right what officers see as a significant weak spot within the first regulation: It targeted on increasing provide with out doing sufficient to stimulate demand. To handle that hole, Chips Act 2.0 is anticipated to introduce demand-side measures, together with public procurement instruments, demand accelerators, and nearer coordination between semiconductor producers and industrial customers. The Fee’s calculation is easy: Stronger home demand will encourage corporations to put money into designing and manufacturing chips in Europe.
However the technique carries a paradox. The AI infrastructure that the Fee hopes will anchor a European semiconductor ecosystem will initially rely nearly fully on superior processors designed by U.S. corporations and manufactured in Asia.
“Key positions are held by a small variety of companies, largely exterior Europe,” Claire Godfrey, govt director of the Balanced Financial system Venture, informed Tech Coverage Press.
AI factories create a requirement entice
The European Fee’s AI Continent action plan consists of 19 AI factories, computing amenities that combine vitality sources, specialised chips, and different infrastructure for working AI fashions and functions, plans for as much as 5 AI gigafactories (since upgraded to seven), and a proposal to a minimum of triple the bloc’s information middle capability inside 5 to seven years beneath the Cloud and AI Development Act. That enlargement would require a big provide of superior AI processors.
The Heart for European Coverage Research (CEPS) estimates that every deliberate AI manufacturing unit website requires as much as 25,000 superior chips, whereas a gigafactory requires a minimum of 100,000.
Virtually all of these processors are anticipated to come back from Nvidia. The corporate provides many of the graphics processing models deployed in Europe, whereas its proprietary CUDA software program underpins a lot of the AI software program ecosystem. CEPS warns this might create an “Nvidia dependency entice,” the place computing infrastructure is bodily positioned in Europe however stays technologically depending on a single U.S. provider.
Latest AI infrastructure tasks in Europe illustrate the issue. Mistral has lined up 13,800 Nvidia GPUs for a knowledge middle close to Paris. Deutsche Telekom’s Munich Industrial AI Cloud is being constructed with practically 10,000 Nvidia Blackwell GPUs. And Nscale says its Sines deployment for Microsoft will begin with greater than 12,600 Nvidia Blackwell Extremely GPUs earlier than increasing to greater than 66,000 in 2027.
Europe nonetheless doesn’t management the chip provide chain
The problem extends nicely past Nvidia. Even when Europe succeeds in increasing semiconductor manufacturing, the worldwide provide chain limits how a lot autonomy any single area can obtain.
“Europe is determined by each the USA and Asia, however at totally different phases of the worth chain,” Toni Roldán-Monés, economist and assistant professor of public coverage at IE College, informed Tech Coverage Press.
“The US maintains a dominant place in areas reminiscent of chip design, mental property, and sure frontier tools. In the meantime, the manufacturing of essentially the most superior semiconductors is extremely concentrated in Asia, particularly in Taiwan and South Korea, whereas China performs a basic function in varied supplies, industrial processes, and significant minerals,” stated Roldán.
Europe’s reliance on third nations is extra evident in some elements of the chip worth chain. In fabrication, Taiwan produces round 90 p.c of the world’s most superior chips. In packaging, meeting, and testing, the EU holds simply 4 p.c of the market and stays extremely depending on Asia, in response to Laith Altimime, President of SEMI Europe.
“The target is… to keep away from extreme dependence on a single nation, firm, or expertise.” Toni Roldán-Monés
“No high 20 meeting, take a look at, and packaging firm is headquartered within the EU,” Godfrey stated. “There’s additionally the supplies challenge. China dominates a number of inputs utilized in key elements of the semiconductor and superior electronics provide chain.”
Europe nonetheless retains vital benefits.
The area is dwelling to ASML, the Dutch firm that dominates the marketplace for extreme ultraviolet lithography systems, and to Belgium’s Imec, one of many world’s main semiconductor analysis facilities. Europe additionally stays a key provider of specialist supplies and energy electronics.
These strengths, nonetheless, “don’t translate into autonomy throughout the semiconductor worth chain,” Roldán stated.
Sovereignty means resilience, not self-sufficiency
Few specialists imagine full semiconductor self-sufficiency is achievable.
As an alternative, the objective needs to be to cut back strategic vulnerabilities reasonably than eradicate worldwide interdependence. “It’s not conceivable that one nation can rebuild the provision chain. International collaboration is vital,” SEMI Europe’s Altimime informed Tech Coverage Press. SEMI forecasts that by 2028 the Europe, Center East, and Africa area will solely manufacture about 68 p.c by quantity of the non-memory semiconductor chips it calls for.
“The problem is to cut back dependencies that might turn into geopolitical vulnerabilities,” argues Roldán. “The smart method is to strengthen essential elements of the worth chain, diversify suppliers, shield delicate information, and develop home capabilities in strategic sectors. That may coexist completely nicely with international suppliers: The target is to not expel them, however to keep away from extreme dependence on a single nation, firm, or expertise.”
That distinction is particularly related for Europe’s sovereignty ambitions. As Godfrey notes, “European companies are constructing round Nvidia {hardware}, CUDA, cloud infrastructure, and the software program decisions that include them. That leaves Europe with two issues. It depends on Asian manufacturing and supplies chokepoints. It is usually prone to attempting to handle that publicity by tying itself extra intently to U.S.-controlled AI and cloud infrastructure. The Chips Act 2.0 must cope with each, or it is going to miss a big a part of the issue.”
Roldán stated Europe’s best vulnerability is dependence on companions keen to make use of world provide chains for geopolitical leverage. Whether or not Chips Act 2.0 reduces that danger, specialists say, will rely on whether or not it diversifies suppliers reasonably than simply shifting dependence from Asian producers to U.S. expertise corporations.
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