Bamako, Mali – An unprecedented battlefield partnership between a separatist motion and an al-Qaeda affiliate has remodeled the battle in northern Mali, shifting the army steadiness and deepening divisions over how, if in any respect, the conflict can finish.
When the Azawad Liberation Entrance (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched a joint offensive on April 25, 2026, the battle entered a section not like any earlier than.
A conflict that had lengthy pitted the Malian state in opposition to a number of armed teams gave approach to a coordinated marketing campaign stretching from Kidal and Anefis to Tilemsi, Gao and Sevare, posing essentially the most critical problem to the Malian military in years and to Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-backed power that changed the Wagner Group in Mali.
Since then, the combating has been marked by simultaneous assaults, ambushes, drone strikes and assaults on army convoys, with all sides claiming important battlefield features.
Bamako says it’s working to revive state authority and dismantle what it calls a “terrorist alliance” between the FLA and JNIM.
The FLA says it stays dedicated to independence for Azawad, the title separatists use for northern Mali, whereas JNIM portrays the conflict as a part of a marketing campaign to “liberate” Mali and overthrow the federal government, which it accuses of counting on Russian forces.
Extra important than the offensive itself, nonetheless, is the unprecedented army cooperation between a nationalist separatist motion and an al-Qaeda affiliate.
Their political ambitions stay essentially completely different, but their cooperation has already reshaped the battle and will have far-reaching implications for safety throughout the Sahel.
The partnership emerged after the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Settlement, which sought to finish years of combating between Bamako and northern armed teams by means of larger decentralisation and political illustration, however whose implementation repeatedly faltered.
Successive army coups after 2020 reshaped Mali’s political management and safety technique. The Financial Group of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali and imposed sanctions, whereas Russia deepened its army position by deploying the Wagner Group in late 2021.
After Russia folded the Wagner Group’s operations into the state-controlled Africa Corps, renewed combating left neither the federal government nor northern armed teams in a position to impose a long-lasting settlement.
How the alliance took form
On paper, cooperation between the FLA and JNIM seems unlikely. The FLA traces its roots to northern separatist actions that declared the independence of Azawad in the course of the 2012 revolt, a declare by no means recognised by the Malian state or the worldwide neighborhood.
It presents itself as a secular nationalist motion searching for independence for Azawad, whereas JNIM seeks to overthrow governments it considers illegitimate and set up governance primarily based on its interpretation of Islamic legislation.
But senior officers from each teams advised Al Jazeera these ideological variations have been put aside to confront a standard enemy.
Colonel Mohamed Issa, a senior FLA officer, mentioned the motion remained dedicated to an unbiased Azawad, arguing that earlier peace agreements repeatedly collapsed as a result of successive governments in Bamako didn’t honour them.
Negotiations, he mentioned, would solely be acceptable in the event that they recognised Azawad’s proper to separate.
Issa rejected strategies of an ideological alliance, describing the connection as a battlefield association in opposition to a standard enemy.
He mentioned the JNIM-affiliated fighters working alongside the FLA have been solely Azawadis relatively than members of the group’s wider regional community, arguing they have been motivated primarily by defending their communities in opposition to the Malian military and what he described as Russian “mercenaries”.
Suleiman, a senior JNIM area commander who requested that solely his first title be used for safety causes, described the connection in broader phrases.
He mentioned the group authorized operational coordination with the FLA after inside consultations as a result of fighters on each side largely got here from “one folks” caught up in the identical battle and since their liberation objectives had turn out to be “comparatively unified”.
He additionally claimed the FLA had accepted Islamic authorized arbitration by native non secular students, one among JNIM’s core aims, a degree the FLA itself didn’t increase. Bamako, in the meantime, has described the connection as a “JNIM/FLA terrorist alliance” that threatens Mali’s sovereignty.
The differing accounts illustrate each the energy and the fragility of the association. For now, shared battlefield pursuits seem to outweigh ideological variations. Whether or not that continues to be true because the battle evolves is way much less sure.
A shifting steadiness of energy
The partnership has altered not solely the battlefield however the way in which the conflict is fought.
FLA officers say working alongside JNIM has enabled each teams to divide obligations and pool experience in assaults on army bases and provide convoys.
![A destroyed vehicle at the site of recent fighting in northern Mali [Photo: Courtesy of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Mali-army-3-1785041272.jpeg?w=770&resize=770%2C578&quality=80)
Bamako disputes casualty figures launched by the armed teams and insists its forces retain the initiative. Even so, the battle has turn out to be markedly extra subtle, with simultaneous assaults throughout distant places, engagements lasting a number of days and ambushes focusing on reinforcements earlier than they attain the entrance traces.
Drones have assumed an more and more outstanding position, serving not solely as reconnaissance platforms however more and more as strike weapons in opposition to automobiles and army positions. Malian forces, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps, proceed to rely closely on air energy, but months of sustained combating counsel neither facet has secured a decisive benefit.
The conflict economic system
Lengthy-established financing and trafficking networks proceed to maintain each side.
JNIM sources describe a funding mannequin constructed on regional industrial networks, organised zakat collections and sources collected over years, together with proceeds linked to earlier al-Qaeda kidnapping-for-ransom operations.
The FLA says it depends totally on donations organised by tribal leaders, merchants and neighborhood associations.
Officers from each teams additionally acknowledged that people linked to the actions take part in illicit economies, together with trafficking throughout the Sahara, though the extent to which these actions finance the conflict stays tough to confirm.
Weapons have proved as necessary as funding. Arms have flowed throughout the Sahel because the collapse of Libya in 2011, offering armed teams with a gentle supply of kit.
The newest combating has opened one other provide channel: weapons and army automobiles captured from Malian forces now kind an more and more necessary a part of each teams’ arsenals.
Can both facet win?
There may be little to counsel the battle is nearing an finish.
The Malian military retains a transparent benefit in air energy, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps. But the FLA and JNIM proceed to mount coordinated operations throughout a lot of northern Mali.
![An armed man carries a weapon in a desert area of northern Mali, where government forces and armed groups have been fighting for control of territory [Photo: Courtesy of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/FLA2-1785041279.png?w=770&resize=770%2C1023&quality=80)
The army standoff displays a wider political impasse. Bamako stays dedicated to preserving Mali’s territorial integrity, the FLA insists on independence for Azawad and JNIM continues to hunt the overthrow of the federal government.
None has shifted place because the newest combating started, and nothing on the battlefield has but compelled any of them to take action.
These competing aims additionally forged doubt on how lengthy the 2 teams can proceed combating collectively. Their partnership rests on a standard enemy relatively than a shared political imaginative and prescient, making its future unsure.
A conflict with out an endgame
Three months into the most recent offensive, northern Mali stays locked in a battle with no apparent finish in sight. The partnership between the FLA and JNIM has reshaped the army panorama, whereas Bamako continues to reject any consequence that would weaken Mali’s territorial integrity.
What started as a confrontation between the state and separate armed actions has developed right into a battle formed by competing visions of sovereignty, separatism, rule by al-Qaeda-linked armed teams and the involvement of exterior powers.
Until these competing ambitions – territorial unity, independence and regime change – are addressed alongside the combating, a negotiated settlement is prone to stay elusive.
No matter occurs subsequent, the partnership cast in April 2026 has already modified the course of the conflict in northern Mali. Whether or not it endures or fractures below the load of its competing ambitions, it has created a brand new army and political actuality whose penalties are prone to prolong nicely past Mali’s borders.
